Minimum Price Fixing in the Bituminous Coal Industry by Waldo E. Fisher & Charles M. James
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Minimum Price Fixing in the Bituminous Coal Industry





Chapter Title: THE BITUMINOUS COAL ACT OF 1937
Chapter Author: Waldo E. Fisher, Charles M. James
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2882
Chapter pages in book: (p. 39 - 49)CHAPTER III
THE BITUMINOUS COAL ACT OF 1937
IT WILL be recalled that the Act of 1935 had attempted to stabilize
the industry by establishing labor standards and by regulating the
distribution of coal by producers. When the Supreme Court de-
clared the Act unconstitutional because of its labor standards, pro-
ponents of control sought to attain their ends by writing legislation
to regulate the sale and distribution of coal in interstate commerce.
The resulting law, the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, became ef-
fective on April 26 for a period of four years.' It was later extended
for two years and four months.
A. Objectives to be Attained under the Act
In the preamble to the Act of 1937 Congress called attention
to practices and methods of distributing and marketing bituminous
coal that waste the nation's coal resources and disorganize, burden,
and obstruct interstate commerce in such coal. It then declared
that correction of these practices required the regulation of the sale
and distribution of coal by means of price control and the elimina-
tion of unfair methods of competition. This preamble is not to be
taken as a full statement of the framers' objectives, but rather as an
expression of policy and purpose made in the hope (later fulfilled)
of satisfying the courts that the objectives of the Act conform to
the constitutional powers of Congress.
The primary purpose of the law was to establish minimum prices
and maintain a "cost-floor" under the sale of bituminous coal at
the mine so as to improve the position of the industry and enable it
to pay the wages and meet the terms of employment arrived at
under collective bargaining. The Act thus provided for the estab-
lishment of a minimum price structure for bituminous coal which
would return to producers an income equal to their costs less capi-
tal charges.2 The prices to be established were to apply not only
1 The law is sometimes referred to as the Guffey-Vinson Act. It is identi-
fied as 50 U.S. Stat. at L. (1937), 72. Subsequent references in this study
to "the Act" apply to this law. The Act is reproduced in Appendix G below.
2 The costs used in price fixing included: "...labor,supplies, power,
taxes, insurance, workmen's compensation, royalties, depreciation, and deple-
tion (as determined by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in the computation
of the federal income tax) and all other direct expenses of production, coal
operators' association dues, district board assessments for Board operating
expenses only levied under the code, and reasonable costs of selling and the
cost of administration." (Sec. 4-ha.)
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to competitive coals in interstate commerce but also to those in
intrastate commerce directly affecting interstate commerce. Under
this provision all the states producing bituminous coal except North
Carolina (a part of District 8) were declared by the Commission.
to be subject to the terms of the Act.
The elimination of "unfair methods of competition" arising in
the main from discriminatory trade practices was both an objective
of the Act and an aid to the maintenance of minimum prices. Like
many other producers anxious to obtain sales volume, coal opera-
tors or their agents frequently engage in practices which tend to
undermine the price structure. Thirteen such practices were de-
clared to be in violation of the Code to be established under the
Act the 1937 Act did not
make its objectives with to labor an inherent part of the
mechanism of price control. It will be recalled that the earlier law
prohibited certain labor practices on the part of employers, required
operators to accept the principle of collective bargaining as a con-
dition of code membership, and established a three-man Bituminous
Coal Labor Board. These provisions were designed to maintain a
union contract structure throughout the industry and to insure that
the effects of the competitive struggle would not be passed on to
the workers in the form of lower wages or less favorable terms of
employment. Because these provisions were the basis of the old
Act's nullification, the framers of the 1937 Act substituted a decla-
ration of labor policy for the labor provisions of the earlier Act.4
These practices may be listed as follows: predating and postdating of
sales documents except in accordance with a bona fide agreement entered
into on the predate; splitting commissions, paying rebates in any form, ad-
justing claims, and prepaying freight charges for the purpose of price dis-
crimination; misrepresenting coal sold or purchased; using without authori-
zation a competitor's trade mark or advertising; using brokerage commis-
sions or those of sales agents to obtain business at prices below the minimum;
inducing or trying to induce breach of a competitor's contract; extending to
certain buyers services or privileges not extended to all; attempting to obtain
preferment with buyers by employing a sales agent at a compensation dis-
proportionate to the ordinary value of the services rendered; consigning un-
ordered coal or forwarding unsold coal except as provided in the Act, and
attempting to get business or obtain information about a competitor's busi-
ness by concessions, gifts, or bribes. (Sec. 4-hi.)
The majority of the Court ruled that the labor provisions could not be
regarded as "directly affecting interstate commerce," and concluded that
the provisions on price fixing and trade practices were inextricably linked
with the labor provisions. (Carter v. Carter Coal Company { 1936], 298
U.S. 238.)
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The Act declared it "to be the public policy of the United States"
that employees in the industry "shall have the right to organize
and to bargain collectively with respect to their hours of labor,
wages, and working conditions through representatives of their own
choosing, without restraint, coercion, or interference on the part of
the producers." It was also declared to be contrary to public policy
for producers to (1) interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of these rights, (2) to discharge or discriminate against
any employee for the exercise of these rights, and (3) to require
any employee or applicant as a condition of employment to join an
association for collective bargaining in the management of which
the producer has any share of direction or control.5 This declaration
of policy merely reiterated rights which are guaranteed by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, the provisions of which are applicable
to mine workers.
Still another objective of the Act, written into the preamble, was
to eliminate practices and methods of distributing and marketing
coal that, among other things, waste the coal resources of the na-
tion. The Act, however, did nothing to effectuate this objective ex-
cept to instruct the Commission to "investigate the economic opera-
tion of mines with the view to the conservation of the national coal
resources." (Sec. 14a.)
In addition to the stated objectives of the Act, there was an im-
plied objective. Undoubtedly, Congress in enacting thislegislation
sought to bring about stability within an industry which for a
decade and a half had been characterized by virtual disorganization.
Apparently, the impact of the prevailing economic forces and con-
ditions (described in Chapter I) upon workers, investors, man-
agement, and indirectly the public, made such action advisable.
B. Code and Agencies Created by the Act
The establishment of some hundreds of thousands of individual
mine prices was a gigantic task. The organizational framework
created to carry out this and related objectives consisted of the
Bituminous Coal Code with its district boards, the National Bi-
The policy was indirectly implemented in the case of federal purchases
of bituminous coal for which bids are required by a provision specifying
that no coal produced at any mine in which the producer fails to accord
these rights shall be purchased by the United States or its departments or
agencies. Whenever violation of this provision was charged by any employee
or interested party, the Commission might hold hearings to determine the
facts and in case of noncompliance notify the agency involved which, in
turn, had to declare the contract terminated.
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tuminous Coal Commission and its statistical bureaus, and the
Office of the Consumers' Counsel.
1. BITUMINOUS COAL CODE
The Act established a Bituminous Coal Code in which producers
were invited to accept membership. Theoretically membership was
voluntary; actually it was obligatory in that nonmember producers
were subject to a tax of per cent on all coal sold.6
Code membership carried with it certain privileges and obliga-
tions. Coal producers who were Code members had a vote in the
election of their respective district boards which had been given
the opportunity to propose minimum prices for the coals produced
in their districts and, after these prices had been approved or modi-
fied, to coordinate them "in common markets." Code membership,
therefore, carried representation in the price-fixing procedure as
well as in the formulation of rules and regulations pertaining to
code members. Twenty-three district boards of Code members were
to be created.7 They were to be composed of an odd number of
members (not less than 3 nor more than 17), all of whom had to
be Code members except one who was to be selected by the miners'
union representing the preponderant number of employees in the
district.8 Code members who were dissatisfied with coordinated or
established prices or with the authorized marketing rules and regu-
lations also had the right to petition and to be heard before the
Commission. Moreover, producers who were Code members were
permitted, under certain conditions, to establish producers' mar-
keting agencies which would permit them to engage in the coopera-
tive marketing of their Such agencies of Code members, when
approved by the Commission, became exempt from the provisions
of the antitrust laws.
6 Experience under the Coal Code of the National Industrial Recovery Act
had apparently convinced the framers of the Act that voluntary acceptance
of the new Code would not be sufficient to insure its successful operation.
? The number was reduced to 22 when the Commission decided that the
coal produced in District 21 (North and South Dakota) is lignitic and hence
did not come under the Act.
8 Half of the producers' representatives were to be elected by a majority
vote of the Code members in the District, and half by the Code members vot-
ing on a tonnage basis. This method was designed to give representation to
both large and small producers. The bylaws and procedures adopted by
the district boards were subject to the approval of the Commission. (Sec.
4-Ia.)
The members of such agencies had to accept membership in the Code,
comply with the rules and regulations laid down by those administering the
Act, and refrain from attempts to restrict unreasonably the supply of coal.
(Sec. 12.)
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In return for these advantages and to prevent infringements of
the Code, certain obligations were imposed upon members. First,
they were not to• violate the Code by selling coal at prices lower
than the declared minima or higher than the declared maxima
should maximum prices be established; second, they were not to
evade the price schedules of the Code by direct or indirect ab-
sorption of any transportation or incidental charge, or by free use
of docks or other storage or transportation facilities; third, they
could not engage in any of the 13 unfair methods of competition
declared to be in violation of the Code;'° fourth, they had to fur-
nish the statistical data required by the Commission; and fifth, they
were required to defray the expenses of the district boards by pay-
ing assessments computed on a tonnage basis.
The 1937 Code, it will be observed, contained two features
which especially distinguished it from the 1935 Code. First, the tax
provisions of the 1937 Code were quite different. The old Act had
levied a tax of 15 per cent on all coal sales and provided that 90
per cent of this tax was to be automatically refunded to coal pro-
ducers who were Code members. The new Act, in contrast, levied
two taxes: a tax of 1 per cent per ton (except on coal sold to govern-
mental agencies), and a separate penalty tax of 1 91/2percent
on the mine price of coal sold by producers who were not members
of the Code.11 The tax provisions of the new Act no longer directly
linked the expenses incurred in its administration with the taxes
levied on coal companies. These expenses were to be met by ap-
propriations from the general Treasury. The separation of expenses
and taxes, apparently made because of its possible bearing on the
legality of the Act, did not obscure the relation between the revenue
derived from the tax and the expense of administering the coal law.
The second important difference between the 1935 and the
1937 Codes had to do with the part played by the district boards
in the establishment of minimum prices. Under the former Act each
district board was to establish, in accordance with a prescribed
formula, minimum prices for its district which were to be effective
unless specifically disapproved by the Commission. This phase of
the law had been criticized because it gave agencies of the pro-
ducers too much control over minimum prices. The 1937 Act,
however, definitely limited the district boards to proposals of mini-
mum prices and vested the power to determine and establish such
10Forstatement of unfair competitive practices see note 3.
11Inthe case of coal disposed of by book transactions of one kind or
another, the penalty tax applied to "the fair market value" of such coal.
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pricesin a National Bituminous Coal Commission, an agency of
the Federal Government.
2. NATIONAL BITUMINOUS COAL COMMISSION
The Act provided for a Commission of seven members to be ap-
pointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate for a term of four years. Two of the members were re-
quired to have had past experience as producers and two as mine
workers. The remaining three members represented the public.'2
The Commission was responsible for the promulgation and ad-
ministration of the Code, the compilation of cost data, the computa-
tion of weighted average costs for minimum price areas, and the
establishment, review, modification, and maintenance of minimum
prices. It had to pass upon the marketing rules and regulations
proposed by the district boards as well as the marketing agency
agreements which it could also suspend or revoke. It was instructed
to study or investigate (1) new uses for coal, (2) problems re-
lating to the import and export of coal, (3) conservation of na-
tional coal resources by more economical operation of coal mines,
(4) reduction of working hazards in coal mining, (5)problems
of marketing from the standpoint of reducing distributing costs to
the consumers, and (6) the necessity for the control of coal pro-
duction and the methods of such control, including allotment of
output to districts and producers. Finally, it was required also to
make a full report of its activities to Congress.
To carry out these duties and to safeguard the interests of the
consumers and the public, the Commission was empowered to re-
quire reports from producers, to establish field offices with which
operators had to file copies of sales contracts, invoices, and credit
memoranda, and to which they had to submit spot prices and data
on costs, sales, and distribution of coal as directed by the Com-
mission. It could require operators to maintain a uniform system
of accounting, could review all rules of district boards, and could
make complaints to and be heard by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission with respect to rates and other matters relating to the
transportation of coal. It was also authorized to compel persons
to testify and produce records, to prescribe reasonable maximum
12Noneof the members was permitted during the period of service to
engage in any other business or employment, or to have any financial in-
terest in the mining, transportation, or sale of coal, oil, or gas, or in the
generation, transportation, or sale of hydroelectric power, or in the manu-
facture of machinery for these competing fuels, or for the use of hydroelec-
tric power. (Sec. 2a.)
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discountsto distributors who resell coal in cargo or railroad carload
lots, and to require such distributors to observe resale prices as
well as marketing rules and practices established under the Code.
The Commission, moreover, could hear complaints of Code viola-
tions and excessive coal prices and take action to correct such abuses,
determine the extent of the interdependence of interstate and intra-
state commerce in bituminous coal, and make all reasonable rules
and regulations necessary for carrying out the provisions of the
Act.
Realizing that an emergency might arise which would lead to
"unreasonably high prices," the framers of the Act also empowered
the Commission to establish maximum prices for coal at the mine
in any district. These prices were to "be established at a uniform
increase above the minimum prices in effect" at the time, and had to
be high enough in the aggregate to "yield a reasonable return above
the weighted average total cost of the district" and insure the pro-
ducers "a fair return on the fair value of the property." (Sec. 4-TIc.)
3. OFFICE OF THE CONSUMERS' COUNSEL
The interest of the consumers of coal was also to be represented
by an agency in the Department of the Interior called the Office of
the Consumers' Counsel.13 The Counsel was given broad powers to
appear in the interest of the consuming public in proceedings be-
fore the Commission, at which he could offer relevant testimony and
argument, examine and cross-examine witnesses and parties to the
proceeding, and require subpoenas and other processes of the Com-
mission to be issued in his behalf. When necessary to safeguard
consumers' interests he could conduct independent investigations of
matters pertaining to the coal industry and the administration of
the Act, and could require the Commission (1) to furnish pertinent
information at its command, (2) to conduct any investigations of
matters coming under its authority and place the results thereof at
his disposal, and (3) to hear valid complaints of distributors and
dealers. The Office of the Consumers' Counsel as well as the Com-
mission was authorized to make complaints to and be heard by the
Interstate Commerce Commission with respect to rates and other
matters relating to the transportation of coal. The Counsel was in-
structed to make his annual report directly to Congress. (Secs. 2b
and 16.)
TheCounsel was appointed by the President by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, and was subject under Section 2b-1 to the same
restrictions on outside activities as were the Commissioners.
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C. Criteria and Procedure to Be Used in Establishing Prices
Prices were to be determined initially by producing districts and
then coordinated in common consuming markets. Since the basis
for establishing prices was the weighted average cost, the first step
became the compilation of cost data.'4 These were to be collected by
the Commission's statistical bureaus and supplied to the producers'
boards. Each producers' board working with the cost data was in-
structed to determine for its district "the weighted average of the
total costs of the ascertainable tonnage produced" for the year 1936
and to adjust it for any subsequent changes in wage rates, hours,
and other relevant factors (except seasonal changes)that had sub-
stantially affected costs. The weighted costs for the various dis-
tricts were then to be forwarded to the Commission where they were
to be reviewed (modified when necessary) and combined into
weighted averages for each of the minimum price areas. These
areas, generally speaking, brought together those producing dis-
tricts that had approximately the same costs of It was
the weighted average cost of the minimum price area in which the
district was located, and not the district cost, that was to be used
in price fixing.
The second step in the price-fixing procedure was the proposal
of uncoordinated minimum prices. Each producers' board was asked
to propose for its district both a classification of its coal and a
schedule of minimum mine prices. The prices for a given district
were (1) to be for "kinds, qualities, and sizes of coal," (2) to re-
flect "variations as to mines, consuming market areas, values as to
uses and seasonal demand," and (3) to yield a return per net ton
that was "equal as nearly as may be" to the weighted average cost
of the minimum price area to which the district was assigned. The
proposed minimum prices for a district were to "reflect, 'as nearly as
possible, the relative market value of the various kinds, qualities,
and sizes of coal," were to "be just and equitable as between pro-
ducers within the district,." and were to "have due regard to the
interests of the consuming public." (Sec. 4-ha.) The schedule of
minimum prices for each district, together with the supporting
14 For items included in the costs used in establishing prices see note 2
in this chapter.
15 Senator Neely, Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st sess., 81:3 (April
5, 1937), 3141. This principle was not, however, the sole consideration.
Michigan, for example, was included in Minimum Price Area 1 in spite
of that state's very high costs, probably because its tonnage was so small
that the creation of a special minimum price area for Michigan was not
thought desirable.
46THE COAL ACT OF 1937
data including the factors considered in determining the price rela-
tionship, were to be forwarded to the Commission for approval,
disapproval, or modification. With the Commission's action upon
these proposed prices the second step would be concluded.
The district boards were also required to prepare reasonable rules
and regulations incidental to the sale and distribution of coal by
Code members in the district. The proposed rules and regulations
submitted by the several districts, after they had received the ap-
proval of the Commission, were to be coordinated with those of
other districts before receiving the Commission's final endorsement.
This process, although it was carried out while the boards were
engaged in classifying and determining uncoordinated minimum
prices, may be regarded as the third step in the price-fixing pro-
cedure.
The fourth step was the coordination of the price schedules sub-
mitted to the 22 district boards. The Act gave the district boards
the opportunity, under rules and regulations established by the
Commission, to coordinate their prices "in common consuming mar-
kets," the establishment of which was left to the Commission. If
the district boards failed to accomplish this task within an allotted
time, it became the responsibility of the Commission. In either case
the prices thus determined "...forany kind, quality, or size of
coal for shipment into any common consuming market area shall
be just and equitable, and not unduly prejudicial or preferential,
as between and among districts, shall reflect, as nearly as possible,
the relative market values, at points of delivery in eaóh common
consuming market area, of the various kinds, qualities, and sizes of
coal produced in the various districts, taking into account values as
to uses, seasonal demand, transportation methods and charges and
their effect upon a reasonable opportunity to compete on a fair basis,
and the competitive relationship between coal and other forms of
fuel and energy; and shall preserve as nearly as may be existing
fair competitive opportunities." (Sec. 4-JIb.) The resulting prices
had to yield a return per net ton upon the entire tonnage of the
minimum price area which approximated the weighted average of
the total cost per net ton of the tonnage of the minimum price area.
The fifth step consisted of hearings to be held by the Commission
at which all matters pertaining to the determination of coordinated
minimum prices could be considered.
The final step of the process occurred when the coordinated mini-
mum prices, as proposed, modified, and approved, were put into
effect. The Commission's price-fixing activities, however, were not
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wholly terminated by this step. From time to time it might review
and when necessary revise the established minimum prices. Revi-
sion became compulsory when any district board could show that
costs in the minimum price area had moved up or down more than
2 cents a ton.
D. Provisions for Enforcing the Act
In bituminous coal, as in any highly competitive industry, there
is always a temptation to sell or otherwise dispose of products be-
low prevailing prices or to grant discounts or to use other subter-
fuge.s which would give those engaging in such practices a com-
petitive advantage. The widespread evasion of the Coal Code of
the NRA indicates how extensive this practice may become when
adequate checks do not prevail.
To ensure that the Commission would be in a position to compel
Code members to comply with the provisions of the Act, Congress
granted it two specific powers. It authorized the Commission, after
public hearing, to i.ssue cease-and-desist orders for violations of the
Act and,cases of noncompliance with its orders, to apply to a
circuit court of appeals for enforcement. It also empowered the
Commission, after a hearing and 30 days' written notice, to sus-
pend Code members guilty of a violation of the Code and thereby
make them subject to the 19'/2percent tax on the price of the
coal thus sold.16
Other provisions of the Act also had a bearing on enforcement.
Contracts for periods longer than thirty days (except with govern-
mental agencies) were prohibited prior to the establishment of min-
imum prices. As a result, evasion of the price schedules by long-
term contracts was precluded. Through its power to prescribe maxi-
mum discounts or price allowances that could be made by Code
members to distributors who purchased coal for resale in cargo or
railroad carload lots, and by its authority to compel such distribu-
tors to maintain and observe both the prices and the marketing
rules and regulations established under the Act, the Commission
had two additional controls to prevent widespread evasion of the
price schedules. Moreover, because copies of sales invoices, con-
tracts, spot orders, etc. had to be filed with its statistical bureaus,
the Commission was in a position to verify the price, quantity, qual-
'°Inorder to receive reinstatement, producers whose code membership
had been revoked had to pay to the United States double the amount of
the 19½ per cent tax on all coal sold in violation of the Code or regula-
tions established thereunder. (Sec. 5c.)
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ity, destination, etc. of all sales by Code members. This information
could be helpful in locating and verifying Code violations. In in-
vestigating complaints of violations of the Code or of the rules and
regulations prescribed under it, the Commission might require nec-
essary reports from and have access to books and records of Code
members.'7 Finally, enforcement was also aided by the provision
which permitted any Code member sustaining injury from another
member by reason of failure to comply with the Act to sue in any
court of competent jurisdiction where the defendant resided or did
business and to recover threefold damages and the cost of the suit
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
17Producerswho failed to file a report required by the Commission within
the time prescribed and who after notice of default continued such failure
for 15 days, were subject to a "forfeit" of $50, payable to the Treasury
of the United States, for each and every day of the continuance of such
failure.
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